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Introduction and summary
Do people run down their assets after retirement? This 
is an important question for a number of reasons. First, 
the elderly have a lot of wealth: Households with heads 
who are 65 years old and older have more than one-
third of all U.S. household wealth. Given that the baby 
boomer cohort is approaching retirement age, this 
fraction will likely increase. Whether the baby boom-
ers run down their wealth has important implications 
for all of us. Some have argued that when the boomers 
retire, they will run down their assets. They will wish 
to sell their assets, which will in turn drive down the 
price of assets. Poterba (2001) refers to this as the 
“asset market meltdown hypothesis.” As Poterba 
points out, however, this depends critically upon how 
quickly the elderly actually run down their assets.
In this article, we provide evidence that households 
run down their assets after retirement. We track a group 
of elderly households over the 1996–2004 period, and 
find that assets for these households decline modestly 
over the sample period. However, the U.S. experienced 
a remarkable run-up in housing prices from 1996 through 
2004. Thus, the fact that assets declined modestly does 
not mean that households planned to run down their 
assets modestly. Instead, it could be that households 
planned to run down their assets rapidly, but enjoyed 
high asset returns. Thus, using these measured asset 
profiles might give us a very misleading picture of what 
the baby boomers may do with their wealth. We find 
that, had there been no run-up in asset prices, assets 
would have declined substantially over the sample period.
Related literature and contributions of our article
The question of whether the elderly run down 
their assets has been debated at least since Modigliani 
and Ando (1957), in part because the answer to the 
question provides key insights as to why people save 
over the course of their lives.
There are two main reasons why the elderly 
maintain high levels of assets after retirement. First, 
the elderly presumably maintain assets to finance 
consumption after retirement. Furthermore, given 
that the elderly are presumably unsure of the age at 
which they will die and are unsure of the medical  
expenses they may incur after retirement, they must 
maintain additional assets to insure themselves against 
these risks. Second, the elderly may be slow to reduce 
their assets during retirement because they wish to 
bequeath some of their assets to their children, rela-
tives, friends, or charities. Determining the extent of 
asset rundown during retirement is important for un-
derstanding whether these motivations are important. 
Better understanding these savings motives will 
help us to better inform policymakers as to the likely 
effects of changing tax and transfer systems within 
the United States. For example, consider a policy  
issue where it is important to consider savings motives 
of individuals at the end of their lives: estate taxation. 
The estate tax is a tax on assets that remain after an 
individual dies and, for this reason, is sometimes 
called the “death tax.” On July 7, 2001, President 
George W. Bush signed into law the Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, which raised the 
estate tax exemption level and reduced the tax rate 
on estates starting in 2002. Before the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act was passed, 
only estates valued over $675,000 were taxed. The 
exemption rose to $1,000,000 in 2002, then rose again 
to $1,500,000 in 2004, and is currently $2,000,000  49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(because the exemption level is per person, this trans-
lates into $4,000,000 per couple). Given the current 
$2,000,000 exemption level, only 0.5 percent of all  
estates are subject to the estate tax, according to the 
Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center. Under current law, 
the estate tax exemption level will rise to $3,500,000 
in 2009, and the estate tax will be completely repealed 
in the year 2010 and will be reinstated in 2011. There 
are proposals to repeal the tax permanently, although 
these proposals have stalled in the U.S. Congress. 
Whether or not repealing the estate tax increases 
or reduces gross domestic product (GDP) depends 
critically on the strength and type of the bequest motive. 
If individuals have no bequest motive, indicating they 
do not value the estate that they leave to their children, 
the estate tax will not affect the economic behavior of 
elderly households.1 The alternative to taxes on assets 
left after death is a tax on assets while alive (income 
tax). In contrast to estate taxes, income taxes will likely 
reduce savings and work effort, which causes economic 
inefficiency, or “dead weight loss.” It is likely that any 
loss of federal income due to a repeal of the estate 
taxes will force an increase in income taxes. There-
fore, assuming that progressivity is a desirable feature 
in a tax system and distortions on work decisions and 
savings are undesirable, the repeal of the estate tax 
might be seen as undesirable; that is, the decrease in 
estate taxes reduces progressivity, while the increase 
in the income tax distorts work and savings decisions.
On the other hand, if parents have a strong desire 
to leave a bequest, then taxing estates may reduce na-
tional savings. This reduction may reduce the capital 
stock and thus wages. If bequest motives are impor-
tant, then eliminating the estate tax may raise national 
wealth and income. 
In our analysis, our conclusions differed dramati-
cally depending on whether we used the simple life-
cycle model or one that assumes a bequest motive. 
This indicates that understanding bequest motives is 
important to making policy decisions. An important 
first step for determining the strength of the bequest 
motive is to determine whether individuals decumulate, 
or run down, assets at the end of their lives. The ab-
sence of asset decumulation is potential evidence that 
bequest motives are important. The goal of this article 
is to provide new evidence on the extent to which 
households run down their assets near the end of the 
life cycle. Using data from Asset and Health Dynamics 
Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD)—a survey collected 
by scholars at the University of Michigan—we docu-
ment asset growth at each age for members of different  
cohorts. This allows us to consider the quantitative 
importance of the asset decumulation puzzle.
Most recent research has found that assets de-
cline with age. However, the estimated rate at which 
assets decline differs from study to study. These dif-
ferences across studies arise because of both differences 
in data and methods to calculate assets at different 
ages (see Hurd, 1990, for a review, and Shorrocks, 
1975, and Anderson, French, and Lam, 2004, for dis-
cussions of key methodological issues). 
This article builds upon Anderson, French, and 
Lam (2004), who also investigate the importance of 
asset rundown by using AHEAD data. First, we use 
AHEAD data from 2002 and 2004, whereas Anderson, 
French, and Lam only used data to 2000. Second, we 
conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the rates 
of return faced by sample members.2 Third, we show 
asset profiles, adjusted by rates of return on a year-
by-year basis. 
Asset rundown as predicted by the life-cycle model
In this section, we briefly describe the amount of 
asset rundown that we would expect to see if people 
behaved according to the life-cycle model. We calibrate 
a simple life-cycle model, as described in appendix 1. 
Individuals in the model make consumption and sav-
ings decisions depending on their current assets, their 
perceived income and medical expenses in the future, 
their expectation for how long they will live, and 
their decision to have a bequest motive or not.
A model can help us to frame the questions we 
need to ask in order to understand why people build 
up their savings. A model that is calibrated to the data 
can also illuminate the likely causes of why individu-
als run down their assets so slowly. In this section, we 
provide evidence that uncertain life expectancy, un-
certain medical expenses, and bequest motives are all 
potentially important savings incentives at the end of 
the life cycle.
We begin with the simplest version of the model 
and then move to more complex models. First, we 
present the case in which individuals face no medical 
expense risk, have no bequest motive, and are certain 
to live 12 years (to 82), which is the average life ex-
pectancy for a man aged 70. Panel A of figure 1 pres-
ents the asset profile implied by this model and 
highlights its key implication: Assets at age 82, the 
age of certain death, are equal to zero. This implica-
tion of the life-cycle model is at odds with the data, 
as we describe later.
Panel B of figure 1 presents the asset profile im-
plied by a model augmented to include mortality risk. 
Life expectancy is still 12 years, but there exists the 
possibility of living much longer. Panel B shows that 
individuals run down their assets much more slowly 50 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
when the model is augmented to account for uncer-
tain life expectancy. Because individuals are risk 
averse, they do not wish to outlive their financial re-
sources, a point made by Davies (1981). By holding 
assets until a very old age, they insure themselves 
against the risk of outliving their financial resources.3 
Nevertheless, the model still predicts that by age 95, 
assets are near zero. Conditional on being age 70, there 
is only a 4 percent chance of surviving to age 95. 
Moreover, mortality rates exceed 20 percent by age 95. 
Therefore, this model indicates that individuals are 
willing to bear the risk of low consumption at age 95 on 
the off chance that they survive to that age. However, 
as we show later, this does not fit what is actually ob-
served; many people still hold considerable levels of 
assets, even at age 95. Therefore, it seems that uncer-
tain life expectancy alone cannot explain the slow 
rate of asset decumulation we observe in the data.4 
Panel C of figure 1 presents the asset profile im-
plied by a model augmented to include medical ex-
penses, as well as mortality risk. The risk of catastrophic 
out-of-pocket medical expenses also helps explain the 
absence of asset rundown. Even in the presence of so-
cial insurance (Medicare and Medicaid), households 
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Asset profiles
A. With no uncertainty or bequest motive
average assets in thousands of dollars
age
B. With life expectancy uncertainty
average assets in thousands of dollars
C. With life expectancy uncertainty and medical    
  expense uncertainty
average assets in thousands of dollars
D. With life expectancy uncertainty, medical    
  expense uncertainty, and bequest motive
average assets in thousands of dollars
Note: All dollar values are in 1998 dollars.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old.
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still face potentially substantial out-of-pocket medical 
expenses (for estimates, see De Nardi, French, and 
Jones, 2006; Brown and Finkelstein, 2004; French 
and Jones, 2004a; Palumbo, 1999; and Feenberg and 
Skinner, 1994). Moreover, nursing home expenses are 
potentially large and virtually uninsurable. French 
and Jones (2004a) find that in any given year, 1 per-
cent of all households incur a medical expense shock 
that costs $44,000 over their lifetimes and 0.1 percent 
of all households incur a medical expense shock that 
costs $125,000 over their lifetimes. Because the med-
ical expenses associated with health problems are 
persistent and the risk of incurring such expenses re-
peatedly could financially decimate a household, this 
could cause a household to keep a large amount of as-
sets in order to buffer itself against the possibility of 
catastrophic medical expenses. Therefore, the risk of 
catastrophic medical expenses might generate precau-
tionary savings on top of those accumulated against 
the risk of living a very long life. Panel C shows that 
individuals run down their assets much more slowly 
when faced with medical expense risk. Nevertheless, 
they still run down their assets much more quickly 
than we see in the data.
Lastly, panel D of figure 1 presents the asset pro-
files implied by a model augmented to include a be-
quest function, as well as medical expenses and 
mortality risk. Unsurprisingly, asset rundown at the 
end of the life cycle is even slower when we augment 
the model to include a bequest function. In short, uncer-
tain life expectancy, uncertain medical expenses, and 
bequest motives all potentially play a part in asset run-
down. Therefore, while a relatively slow rate of asset 
rundown is not necessarily evidence of a bequest mo-
tive, it is consistent with having a bequest motive.
Data
In order to estimate the extent of asset rundown, 
we use data from the Asset and Health Dynamics 
Among the Oldest Old data set. The AHEAD is a 
sample of noninstitutionalized individuals aged 70  
or older. A total of 8,222 individuals in 6,047 house-
holds were interviewed for the AHEAD survey in late 
1993/early 1994. These individuals were interviewed 
again in early 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004.5 
The AHEAD data include a nationally representative 
core sample, as well as additional samples of blacks, 
Hispanics, and Florida residents.
The AHEAD has comprehensive asset measures 
for each time that sample members are interviewed.  
It has information on the value of housing and real 
estate, autos, liquid assets (which include money 
market accounts, savings accounts, and Treasury 
bills), individual retirement accounts (IRAs), Keogh 
plans, stocks, the value of a farm or business, mutual 
funds, bonds, and other assets and investment trusts. 
Our measure of wealth is the sum of all these assets, 
less mortgages and other debts. Following common 
practice (for example, Hurd, 1989, and Attanasio  
and Hoynes, 2000), we exclude pension and Social 
Security wealth. Because assets appear to be signifi-
cantly underreported in the first wave, in 1993/1994 
(see Rohwedder, Haider, and Hurd, 2004), we begin 
our analysis with data from the second wave, in 1996.
There are three important problems with our as-
set data. The first is that the wealthy tend to underre-
port their wealth in virtually all household surveys 
(Davies and Shorrocks, 2000). This leads us to under-
state asset levels at all ages. However, Juster, Smith, 
and Stafford (1999) show that the wealth distribution 
of the AHEAD matches up well with aggregate val-
ues for all but the richest 1 percent of households. A 
second important problem with our data is that it 
spans the years 1996–2004, a period in which there 
was a rapid rise in asset prices. This makes it difficult 
for us to distinguish between intended asset growth 
through active savings versus unintended asset 
growth through unexpectedly high returns. Tackling 
this issue is the goal of our article.
Our data also suffer from attrition—people leav-
ing the sample over time—a problem common to all 
panel data sets. In the AHEAD, attrition is largely due 
to death: Reported deaths are confirmed using the  
National Death Index. However, in some cases, inter-
viewers are unable to track down sample members as 
they move from house to house, and some individuals 
refuse to give follow-up interviews. If the people who 
are difficult to contact differ systematically from 
those we are able to keep track of, “nondeath” attri-
tion could distort the composition of our sample. If, 
for example, it is more difficult to track down poor 
individuals, poor households will be dropped from 
the sample at greater rates than rich ones. 
The third problem with the asset data is that it is 
not clear whether to include the amount held in trust 
accounts. The final wealth question asked of AHEAD 
respondents is whether they have a trust account. 
About 10 percent of all respondents have a trust ac-
count. In 2002, respondents were asked whether the 
value of the trust was included in their previously de-
scribed assets (such as stocks and bonds). Only 6 per-
cent of those with a trust (that is, slightly over 0.6 
percent of the full sample) reported that the value of 
the trust was not already reported in the form of other 
assets. In other words, stock market wealth that is held 
in a trust account is usually reported as stock market 52 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
Household wealth, by asset type
TaBlE 1
  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004
Housing  85,179  87,858  92,875  96,301  106,296
Liquid assets  55,513  49,677  52,094  62,211  57,775
Stocks  54,664  55,785  56,298  48,457  53,456
Automobiles  5,356  5,997  5,562  5,222  4,767
Businesses  15,007  11,369  11,685  16,324  12,883
Individual retirement
 accounts  12,512  12,617  14,481  12,475  12,126
Other assets  3,951  5,448  4,798  3,983  5,813
Debt  3,862  4,195  3,811  4,128  4,884
Total assets  228,322  224,557  233,983  240,845  248,233
Observations  4,408  3,803  3,253  2,723  2,304
         
Notes: The value of estates are not included here. All dollar values are in 1998 dollars. Columns may not total because of rounding.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old.
simple versions of the life-cycle model. However, one 
potential reason that assets did not fall is the run-up in 
asset prices. This section describes the run-up in asset 
prices. All asset prices described henceforth are deflated 
by the Personal Consumption Expenditure deflator.
Figure 2 shows growth in the stock market. Spe-
cifically, it shows the annual total return from both 
dividends and price growth on a broad portfolio of 
stocks (as measured by the Center for Research in  
Security Prices, or CRSP, at the University of Chicago’s  
Graduate School of Business). The CRSP stock mar-
ket index measures the growth of a portfolio of stocks 
that includes all stocks in the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation (NASDAQ) indexes. It is a broader measure 
of stock prices than the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 
or the Wilshire 5000 indexes, although the returns 
from the CRSP stock index and these other two indexes 
look similar. Figure 2 shows not only the annual re-
turn but also the average return over both the 1950–95  
and 1996–2003 periods. Figure 2 shows not only that 
stocks grew at roughly the same rate over the 1996–2003 
period as they did over the 1950–95 period. For ex-
ample, the CRSP index grew at an average annual 
rate of 9.3 percent over the 1996–2003 period, com-
pared with 9.7 percent over the 1950–95 period. 
Figure 3 shows the total return from owning a 
home. The total return includes house price apprecia-
tion and the value of the service flow from housing 
(that is, the value of rent that homeowners need not 
pay), less maintenance costs and property taxes. Most 
of the variability in the series is from variability in 
housing price growth. For price growth rates between 
1950 and 1971, data are from the price index for pri-
vate residential investment divided by the price index 
wealth. Because we do not want to double count this 
wealth, we do not include the value of trusts in our mea-
sure of assets. This is an important difference between 
our article and Anderson, French, and Lam (2004). 
Two additional problems arise from the fact that 
assets are a household-level variable rather than an 
individual-level variable. First, some of the house-
holds in our sample consist of two unmarried individ-
uals. Because it is not clear how these respondents 
might answer the asset questions, we drop these house-
holds. Second, many sample members get married or 
divorced over the sample period. Therefore, changes 
in wealth over time reflect not only savings decisions 
(the object of interest in our article) but also house-
hold formation decisions. To counter this problem, 
we drop individuals who get married or divorced dur-
ing the sample period. To sum up, we keep only those 
households that were either married or single living 
alone in the first wave and that changed household 
structure only because of death.6
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for our 
sample. We are left with 4,408 households alive in 1996 
for the main analysis, of whom 2,304 have at least one 
surviving member in 2004. Mortality rates observed 
in the data are similar to average mortality rates for 
the United States, conditional on age (see Anderson, 
French, and Lam, 2004).
Table 1 shows average reported assets in each wave, 
by type of asset. Housing is the largest component of 
assets, although liquid assets (such as bonds) and stocks 
are also important components of households’ portfo-
lios. The numbers are expressed in 1998 real dollars.7
The run-up in asset prices 
Table 1 shows that assets do not fall over the sam-
ple period, which is contrary to the predictions of the 53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
1.7 percent in the 1950–95 period.  
Appendix 3 provides details of the con-
struction of figure 4. Figure 5 shows the 
return from short-term Treasury bills, 
which averaged 2.4 percent in the 1996–
2003 period, versus 1.9 percent in the 
1950–95 period. Thus, we can see that 
the rates of return on most assets were 
above average over the sample period. It 
is therefore likely that many households 
received unanticipated increases in 
wealth. 
Household portfolios 
Table 2 shows average portfolio 
shares in our AHEAD data.8 It shows that 
in our AHEAD sample in 1996, 37 per-
cent of household wealth was held in 
housing and another 27 percent of house-
hold wealth was held in stocks.9 Much of 
the remainder of household wealth is held 
in assets that likely did not grow very 
much over the sample period, such as 
short-term bonds.
Table 2 also shows portfolio shares 
in the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of 
for all personal consumption expendi-
tures, as measured in the national income 
and product accounts (NIPAs). For hous-
ing price growth after 1971, data are the 
price series from the U.S. Office of  
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s 
(OFHEO) Conventional Mortgage Home 
Price Index, which measures the price 
change for resold single-family homes. 
Because the OFHEO index measures the 
price of the same houses over time, the 
index accounts for the fact that the quali-
ty of houses may have changed over 
time. Details are provided in appendix 2. 
The main reason for the variability in 
the return from housing is in the variabil-
ity of house price appreciation. Figure 3 
shows that housing prices grew much 
more rapidly over the 1996–2003 sample 
period than over the previous 45 years; 
the total return from housing was 8.0 per-
cent over the 1996–2003 period, versus 
4.7 percent over the 1950–95 period. 
Figure 4 shows that the total return 
from bonds (the return includes coupon 
payments) with long maturities was 5.1 
percent in the 1996–2003 period, versus 
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Total return from housing, 1950–2005
annual percent change
Note: See appendix 2 for further details. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, national income and product accounts; U.S. Office of Federal Housing 
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Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, owners’ equivalent rent component; and 
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Funds Accounts of the United States.  
The flow of funds accounts are arguably 
the best measure of the wealth of the 
United States. Note that average shares in 
housing, liquid assets, and stocks are sim-
ilar between the two data sets. However, 
there are differences between the shares 
in the AHEAD and the flow of funds ac-
counts that are worth noting. Most impor-
tantly, AHEAD respondents have less 
business wealth and debt than the general 
population represented in the flow of 
funds accounts. The differences likely 
arise for two reasons. First, AHEAD re-
spondents are old, and old people have 
less business wealth and debt than young-
er people. Second, the AHEAD oversam-
ples the poor, who have very little 
business wealth. 
Calculating rates of return
In this section, we describe our ap-
proach to estimating rates of return. The 
key equation to understanding the ap-
proach is the following:
1)   A(it + 1) = (1 + r(it)(1 – τ(it)))A(it) 
    + S(it), 
where A(it + 1) is individual i’s level of 
assets at time t + 1, A(it) is her level of 
assets at time t, r(it) is her return on as-
sets between t and t + 1, τ(it) is the tax 
rate on capital, and S(it) is her savings 
rate (that is, the difference between con-
sumption and post-tax nonasset income). 
We take a weighted average of re-
turns in different assets to infer the total 
return. Specifically, let there be K differ-
ent types of assets, and suppose that in 
time t a quantity A1(it) is invested in asset 
1, A2(it) is invested in asset 2, … , AK (it) 
is invested in asset K, and between time t 
and t + 1, the various assets have returns 
of r1(t), r2(t), … , rK(t). Thus, we allow 
for heterogeneity in rates of return be-
cause different households have different 
portfolios. However, conditioning on the 
portfolio, we assume all individuals have 
the same return. We assume 
2)  r(it) = [r1(t)s1(it) + … + rK(t)sK(it)], 
where s1(it) =A1(it)/A(it), … , sK(it) = 
AK(it)/A(it). We use the rate of return  
series shown in figures 2–5 and the 
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Total return from short-term Treasury bills, 1950–2005
annual percent change
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Board of Governors  









1950 ’55 ’60 ’65 ’70 ’75 ’80 ’85 ’90 ’95 ’05 2000
One-year Treasury bill returns
Average Treasury bill return, 1950–95
Average Treasury bill return, 1996–2003
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Total return from bonds, 1950–2005
annual percent change
Note: See appendix 3 for further details.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Merrill Lynch; University of 
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Share of total assets, by various types
of assets, 1996
TaBlE 2
  AHEAD  Flow of funds
   
Housing  0.37  0.36 
Liquid assets  0.27  0.25 
Stocks  0.27  0.30 
Autos  0.02  0.11 
Businesses  0.06  0.16 
Other assets  0.02  0.01
Total debt  0.01  0.20   
   
Notes: The shares are of gross assets, not net assets; that is, 
the debt of each asset type is not included. The Asset and Health 
Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey measures wealth 
in individual retirement accounts (IRAs), but not the composition of 
that wealth. We assume that 60 percent of IRA wealth is in stocks 
and 40 percent is in liquid assets.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Asset and 
Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old and Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United 
States.
household-level wealth shares to calculate the house-
hold-level rates of return in equation 2.10
Figure 6 shows average returns using this method 
with the shares described in table 2.11 It 
also shows average returns from an alter-
native method for which we use aggre-
gate data. The close relationship between 
the two series gives us confidence in our 
methods. Regressing the first series upon 
the second yields an R-squared of 0.86.12 
Thus, we take this as evidence that both 
procedures provide reasonable estimates 
of year-specific returns.
To derive our alternative method, as-
sume that everyone faces the same inter-
est rate in year t, defined as r(t). Define 
A(t + 1) as total assets in the U.S. econo-
my at time t + 1, A(t) as total assets at 
time t, S(t) as total savings at time t, and 
τ(t) as the average tax rate on capital. As-
suming that the capital tax rate is uncor-
related with assets, we can rearrange 
equation 1 and solve for r(t):
3)   r(it) = r(t) = (A(t + 1) – A(t) – S(t))/ 
    (A(t) (1 – τ(t)) ) .
Thus, if we know A(t + 1), A(t), S(t), and 
τ(t), we can infer r(t). In our analysis in 
the following section, we use data from 
the flow of funds accounts to infer A(t + 1), 
A(t), and S(t), and we assume τ(t) = 0.2, 
which allows us to infer r(t). Specifically, 
we take aggregate assets and savings (savings are 
measured as personal savings plus undistributed cor-
porate profits) from the flow of funds accounts for the 
period 1950–2003. 
Estimating expected and realized returns 
In this article, we provide some evidence on what 
would have happened to asset changes if there had 
been no sharp run-up in asset prices. In order to do 
this, we need to place sharp restrictions on individual 
behavior. Here, our key maintained assumptions are 
twofold. Our first assumption is that asset prices over 
the 1996–2003 period were expected to be equal to 
the average asset price change in the 1950–95 period. 
Although there is some mixed evidence on whether it 
is possible to forecast asset returns (see Cochrane, 1997, 
for a review), we view this assumption as reasonable. 
Our second assumption is that there is no savings re-
sponse to the run-up in asset prices. This second as-
sumption is probably less plausible. It seems likely 
that as households became richer, they consumed 
some of their newfound wealth. Furthermore, there is 
strong empirical evidence that increases in wealth do 
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It is likely that failure to account for an individu-
al’s consuming her newfound wealth will lead us to 
overstate the importance of rate of return shocks. The 
reason for this is straightforward. Both theory and ev-
idence suggest that unexpected wealth gains today will 
be partly spent in the near future. If all unexpected 
wealth gains were spent immediately, then unexpect-
ed wealth gains would not affect the level of wealth, 
and we would not have to make any adjustments to 
account for asset return shocks. However, we assume 
that all of the unexpected wealth gains will be saved. 
Thus, our procedure “overadjusts” for wealth gains 
and helps put an upper bound on the importance of 
rate of return shocks on intended asset decumulation.
We generate cumulative returns under two sce-
narios: 1) given the realized returns over the 1996–2003 
period, and 2) given the returns had they been at their 
historical average (based on the 1960–95 period). The 
difference will allow us to measure the size of the 
wealth shock for every year of our data.  Although we 
have data back to 1950 for many series, we used data 
back only to 1960 because the data for 1950–59 are 
of lower quality. However, using data going back to 
1950 produced similar results. 
We assume that individual’s expectations of fu-
ture returns in the stock and housing markets comes 
from looking at historical returns. Specifically, we  
assume that an individual’s expected return over the 
1996–2003 period is merely the average return over 
the 1960–95 period for each asset. The difference be-
tween the historical return and our estimated return 
(weighted by its share of the household’s portfolio)  
is our measure of the wealth shock in any given year. 
Specifically, we use the 1996 portfolio shares and rates 
of return over the 1960–95 period to infer wealth 
shocks over the 1996–2003 period.
Using the asset-specific returns listed previously, 
we generate cumulative asset returns using the fol-
lowing approach. As before, let asset type k have re-
turn rk(t) at time t. Then 1 + rk(t) is the dollar value  
of assets priced $1 at time t. Thus, if $1 of asset k at 
time t were held until time T, then the asset would be 
worth (1 + rk(t))*(1 + rk (t + 1))* … *(1 + rk(T – 1)) 
at time T. Using this formula we can solve for a 
household’s wealth for different times in the future. 
Using equation 1, we can write for each household
4)  A(it + 1) = (1 +  r(it)(1 – τ(it)))A(it) + S(it),
A(it + 2) = (1 + r(it + 1)(1 – τ(it + 1)))A(it + 1)  
      + S(it + 1) 
  = (1+ r(it + 1)(1 – τ(it + 1)))(1 +  r(it) 
      (1 – τ(it)))A(t) + (1+ r(it + 1) 
      (1 – τ(it + 1)))S(it) + S(it + 1),
where r(it) is defined in equation 2.
Now define r*k(t + j) as the time t expectation  
of time t + j returns on asset k. Recall that we assume 
that this is the average historical return on asset k  
before time t – 1. Given this assumption, r*k(t + j) =  
r*k(t + j + 1) for all j > 0. In practice, we use the 
1960–95 sample periods to construct r*k(t + j) for the 
different K assets. Furthermore, we define r*(it) = 
s1(it) r*1(t) + s2(it) r*2(it) + … + sK(it) r*K(t).
Analogous to equation 4, we can generate 
5)  A*(it + 2) = (1 + r*(it + 1)(1 – τ(it + 1)))A*(it + 1) 
      + S(it + 1) 
    = (1 + r*(it + 1)(1 – τ(it + 1))) (1+ r*(it)
      (1 – τ(it)))A*(t) + (1+ r*(it + 1)
      (1 – τ(it + 1)))S(it) + S(it + 1),
where A*(it) is the asset level we would have ob-
served if asset returns were at their historical averag-
es. We set A*(it) = A(it) for t = 1996 because this is 
our initial time period. We assume that r*(t + 2)S(it) = 
r(t + 2)S(it) in equation 5. Combining equations 4 and 
5 yields 
6)  A(it + 2) – A*(it + 2) = 
    [(1 + r(it + 1)(1 – τ(it + 1)))(1 +  r(it)
    (1 – τ(it))) – (1 + r*(it + 1)(1 – τ(it + 1)))
    (1 + r*(it)(1 – τ(it)))] A(t).
By assumption, this is the unanticipated capital 
gain. The same approach can be used to calculate the 
difference between actual and expected returns at any 
arbitrary horizon.
Life-cycle asset profiles in the cross section
Given that most studies use cross-sectional data 
to estimate the life-cycle profile of assets, we begin 
by repeating this exercise. By initially replicating the 
results of other studies, we can infer whether our re-
sults differ from previous results because we use dif-
ferent data or because we use different estimation 
techniques. Figure 7 shows mean household assets, 
by five-year age cohorts of the head of household 
(starting with age 70–74 and ending at age 90–94) 
from the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 waves of 
the AHEAD. For 2000 and 2002, we have insufficient 
observations to infer assets for those aged 70–74, and 
in 2004 we have insufficient observations to infer as-
sets for those aged 70–74 and 75–79.13
There are several things that we can note from 
figure 7. First, later cross sections show higher assets 
than earlier cross sections at each age. For example, 
for those aged 75–79, the 1996 cross section shows 
assets equal to $225,000, the 1998 cross section shows 
assets equal to $234,000, the 2000 cross section 57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
shows assets equal to $298,000, and the 2002 cross 
section shows assets equal to $299,000. Second, fig-
ure 7 shows that in each cross section, older heads of 
households have lower assets than younger ones. For 
instance, the 1996 asset profile shows average assets 
of $276,000 for those aged 70–74 and $170,000 for 
those aged 90–94. Asset profiles for other years also 
show lower assets at older ages.
Because the distribution of assets is skewed (that 
is, a small number of households have very high as-
sets), mean assets can give a misleading depiction of 
the asset distribution at each age. Nevertheless, medi-
an and mean asset profiles have similar shapes. For 
example, in 1996, median assets were $117,000 for 
households aged 70–74 and only $44,000 for heads 
of households aged 90–94. These results suggest that 
assets do decline with age. Recall, however, that 
those aged 90–94 in a given year were born 20 years 
earlier than those aged 70–74 in the same year.
Because of a lack of panel data, cross-sectional 
data have often been used to infer life-cycle savings 
decisions. Until recently, panel data on 
wealth were not available, so most analy-
ses of the life cycle were based on single 
cross sections by necessity (see Hurd, 
1990, who mentions the rare exceptions). 
In the next section, we discuss some of 
the problems associated with using a 
cross-sectional profile to infer the evolu-
tion of wealth over the life cycle.
Estimation issues
We estimate life-cycle asset profiles 
of households. However, there are three 
main problems with the estimation of 
life-cycle asset profiles. Here, we discuss 
these problems, as well as our approach 
to dealing with them.
First, in cross-sectional data, we ob-
serve individuals who were born at differ-
ent times (that is, older people were born 
in earlier years than younger people). 
Households from older cohorts have, on 
average, lower real lifetime earnings than 
households from younger cohorts. Thus, 
we would expect the asset levels of 
households in older cohorts to be lower 
than those of younger cohorts in any  
given year. Therefore, comparing older 
households with younger households in  
a particular year leads the econometrician 
to overstate assets when they are young 
and to understate assets when they are 
old. In other words, this will potentially 
lead the econometrician to infer that individuals run 
down their assets near the end of their lives when this 
is not actually the case. For example, over the 1950–
2003 period, per capita income in the United States 
grew on average 1.7 percent per year. Therefore, two 
cohorts born 20 years apart tend to have lifetime in-
comes that are different by a factor of 1.01720 = 1.40. 
In other words, members of the cohort who were 
aged 70–74 in 1996 are likely to have average life-
time incomes that are 40 percent higher than those of 
the cohort who were aged 90–94 in 1996.
A second econometric problem occurs because 
people with lower income and wealth tend to die at 
younger ages than those with higher income and wealth. 
Therefore, the average survivor in a cohort has higher 
assets than the average deceased member of the cohort. 
As a result, “mortality bias” leads the econometrician 
to overstate the average lifetime income of members 
of a cohort. This bias is more severe at older ages, 
when a greater share of the cohort members are dead. 
The econometrician is forced to treat the level of assets 
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of surviving members (who, on average, have had 
higher assets) as indicative of the entire cohort, had 
all members survived. This leads the econometrician 
to increasingly overstate assets as individuals become 
older. Using AHEAD data, Anderson, French, and 
Lam (2004) show that the probability of death for 80-
year-old men who are at the 80th percentile of the wealth 
distribution is 7.0 percent, whereas the probability of 
death for 80-year-old men whose wealth is at the 20th 
percentile of the wealth distribution is 10.1 percent. 
Using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of 
Income and Program Participation, Attanasio and 
Hoynes (2000) find even steeper wealth gradients.
We solve both of these problems by using panel 
data, which allow us to track the same households 
over time. Our profiles are estimated using the growth 
rate of assets for surviving households in different 
years. Because we are tracking the same households 
over time, we are obviously tracking members of the 
same cohort over time. Because we estimate growth 
rates for surviving households, our estimates do not 
suffer from mortality bias. In the next section, we de-
tail these procedures.
While tracking the same households over time 
solves the two problems discussed previously, it also 
creates a problem. As we have pointed out before,  
asset growth of a household represents not only antic-
ipated asset growth through saving but also unantici-
pated asset growth. It is precisely this problem that 
our methods in this article are designed to address. 
Estimation methodology
Figure 8 presents estimates of the life-cycle asset 
profile for four different five-year birth cohorts, using 
both fixed effects (FE) and ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Anderson, French, and Lam (2004) describe 
some of the differences in the two methods. 
Consider a set of individuals referenced by i ∈ 
{1, … ,I} who were born on December 31, 1921 (in 
practice, we use five-year cohorts, this one having 
been born in 1919–23). We observe these individuals 
in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. Therefore, we 
observe members of this cohort at age 74, 76, 78, 80, 
and 82. We denote their age by a ∈ {74, … ,82}. As-
sets of a particular individual at a certain age, denoted 
Aia are determined by the following function:
7)  Aia= fi + β(a) + uia ,
where fi is the individual’s fixed effect, which includes 
all age-invariant factors, uia is a residual, and β(a) is a 
function of a. Note that for a given individual, assets 
can change only because of changes in age, or changes 
in uia. When using a fixed effects estimator, uia and 
β(a)  are uncorrelated by construction. As a result, we 
can obtain consistent estimates of β(a) that are uncon-
taminated by individual heterogeneity. 
We wish to estimate the function β(a), which 
measures how assets change as individuals age. In the 
section titled “Asset rundown as predicted by the life-
cycle model,” the results indicate that understanding 
β(a) will help us better understand savings motives 
after retirement. We estimate the function using a full 
set of dummy variables, that is,
8 1
76 78 80 82
) ( ) { } ,
{ , , , }
β β a age a u age
age
ia = × = +
∈ ∑
where 1{.} represents an indicator function that is 
equal to 1 when the statement in parentheses is true 
and is 0 otherwise.14
The fixed effect  fi and the residual uia merit fur-
ther discussion. The residual captures variation in 
wealth arising from short-term contingencies, such  
as medical expenses. It also captures the difference 
between the true level of assets and reported assets; 
that is, it is possibly a measurement error. 
The fixed effect captures objects such as lifetime 
earnings. Individuals with high lifetime earnings like-
ly have high wealth at every age. The fixed effect is 
potentially correlated with the probability of being 
observed at older ages because poor people (that is, 
those with a low value of fi) die at younger ages. By 
using a fixed effects estimator, we can obtain consis-
tent estimates of the βage parameters. Our fixed effects 
estimator estimates equation 7 for every cohort. 
We also estimate a variant of equation 7 using 
OLS. Specifically, we estimate
  
9) Aia= f + β(a) + uia ,
where β(a) takes the functional form in equation 8. 
Note that f is common to everyone within the cohort, 
so that uia  now includes higher asset levels coming 
from things such as lifetime wealth. Thus, uia is likely 
correlated with the probability of being observed at 
older ages, and thus estimates of the βage parameters 
are inconsistent.
Life-cycle asset profiles
Figure 8 presents estimates of the life-cycle asset 
profile for four different five-year birth cohorts using 
both FE and OLS. The connected lines show how as-
sets change over time for members of specific cohorts. 
These life-cycle profiles are for the cohorts born in 
1919–23, 1914–18, 1909–13, and 1904–08 (or those 59 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
aged 72–76, 77–81, 82–86, and 87–91 in 1996, respec-
tively). Note that in 1996, mean household wealth was 
$256,000 for those aged 72–76, $220,000 for those 
aged 77–81, $194,000 for those aged 82–86, and 
$176,000 for those aged 87–91. In other words, wealth 
of the oldest cohort was 31 percent lower than wealth 
of the youngest cohort in 1996. One could argue that 
this is evidence of asset rundown within households. 
Recall, however, that households aged 87–91 in 1996 
were born 15 years earlier than households aged 72–76 
in 1996. If aggregate income grows 1.7 percent per 
year, then the lifetime income of the oldest cohort is 
26 percent lower than that of the youngest cohort. 
Therefore, the fact that the 1996 wealth level is 31 per-
cent lower for the cohort aged 87–91 relative to the 
cohort aged 72–76 is not necessarily evidence of a 
rundown in assets (although recall that mortality bias 
works in the opposite direction and indicates that the 
cross-sectional evidence may be consistent with a 
modest rundown). When tracking assets of households 
within a cohort, note that assets do not run down over 
the length of the panel when using an OLS estimator. 
For example, assets increase about 6 per-
cent between 1996 and 2004 for the co-
hort born in 1919–23 (or aged 72–76 in 
1996). 
Next, consider the fixed effects pro-
files. Fixed effects profiles show less as-
set growth with age. For example, assets 
decline 12 percent between 1996 and 
2004 for the cohort born in 1919–23. If 
no members of the sample left the survey 
because of death or other reasons, OLS 
would produce the same results as fixed 
effects. However, because sample mem-
bers die, the two profiles are different, es-
pecially for the older cohorts with higher 
mortality rates. Because the fixed effects 
estimator estimates asset growth for the 
same households, it does not suffer from 
mortality bias.
The question remains, however, 
whether these run-ups in assets were an-
ticipated. Because the sample period was 
1996–2004 and the fixed effects profiles 
track asset growth over the sample period, 
the fixed effects profiles still suffer from 
mixing anticipated asset gains with unan-
ticipated asset gains from the stock and 
housing markets, as mentioned previously. 
Figure 9 shows the fixed effects profiles, 
as well as the fixed effects profiles that ad-
just for the run-up in asset prices by using 
the methods described earlier. Specifically, the adjust-
ed profiles show what would have happened to assets 
if there had been no run-up in asset prices and sav-
ings rates had been unchanged. The adjusted profiles 
indicate that, had there been no run-up in asset prices, 
there would have been steep declines in assets over 
the sample period. When adjusting for return shocks, 
assets decline 35 percent between 1996 and 2004 for 
the cohort born in 1919–23. Other cohorts also have 
large asset declines after adjusting for asset returns. 
Between 1996 and 2004, the adjusted fixed effects as-
set profiles decline 27 percent, 41 percent, and 51 per-
cent for the cohorts born in 1914–18, 1909–13, and 
1904–08, respectively. In short, asset profiles decline 
dramatically after adjusting for both mortality bias 
and rate of return shocks.
Table 3 summarizes our results. It shows several 
things. First, the OLS estimates indicate that assets 
rise between 1996 and 2004. Second, fixed effects es-
timates indicate that assets fall with age. Third, mak-
ing adjustments for rate of return shocks indicates that 
individuals would likely have reduced their assets 
FIguRE 8
Wealth profiles: Ordinary least squares and
fixed effects estimates
thousands of dollars
Notes: OLS means ordinary least squares. FE means fixed effects. The 
average age of each cohort in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 was 
used to plot this figure. All dollar values are in 1998 dollars.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Asset and Health 
Dynamics Among the Oldest Old.
age















 Birth cohorts60 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
Estimated wealth change by cohort and 
estimation technique, 1996–2004
TaBlE 3
        Percent
  Average   Percent  Percent  change,
  age in  change,  change,   adjusted
Year of birth  1996  OLS  FE  FE
1919–23  74  0.06  –0.12  –0.35
1914–18  79  0.07  –0.05  –0.27
1909–13  84  0.13  –0.15  –0.41
1904–08  89  0.09  –0.37  –0.51
Notes: OLS means ordinary least squares. FE means fixed effects.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Asset and Health Dynamics  
Among the Oldest Old.
rapidly had there been no run-up in asset prices.  
Finally, older cohorts tend to have more rapid asset 
decumulation than younger cohorts. 
The estimates in this article are similar to esti-
mates in other studies that use panel data and account 
for mortality bias. Hurd (1990) summarizes the earli-
er literature on asset decumulation. For 
example, Hurd (1990) reports that over 
the 1969–79 period, wealth declined 13.9 
percent among retirees when using data 
from the University of Michigan’s Retire-
ment History Survey. This is roughly sim-
ilar to our fixed effects estimates where 
we did not control for the run-up in asset 
prices. Diamond and Hausman (1984), 
using data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ National Longitudinal Survey 
of Mature Men, find that wealth declines 
5 percent per year after retirement during 
the years 1966–76. There are several im-
portant differences between our article 
and these earlier studies. First, the earlier 
studies do not attempt to adjust for rate of 
return shocks. Second, these earlier stud-
ies measured asset changes during a time 
when households received negative re-
turn shocks. Finally, these earlier studies 
did not have much information on the de-
cisions of households with heads aged 80 
and older. Using data from the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer  
Finances for the years 1983–95, Poterba 
(2001) compares those aged 70–74 versus 
those aged 75 and older. He finds that 
those aged 75 and older have 18 percent 
less wealth than those aged 70–74. His 
estimates control for cohort effects, but 
not mortality bias or rate of return shocks. 
Using data from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances, Sabelhaus and Pence (1999) 
account for mortality bias and find some-
what sharper declines in assets.
Conclusion
A key implication of the life-cycle 
model is that assets are run down as indi-
viduals near death. This article presents 
new evidence on asset rundown at the 
end of the life cycle. We show that older 
individuals have lower assets than young-
er individuals when observing individuals 
at different ages at a single point in time. 
We also show that wealth declines mod-
estly with age when tracking the same individuals as 
they age. Because we track households over the 1996–
2004 period, we observe individuals in 1996 and the 
same individuals eight years later, in 2004. Although 
we can measure the asset growth of the exact same 
people, we do not know whether assets grew because 
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of intentional savings decisions or because of the run-
up in asset prices over this period. Using the methods 
described in this article to adjust for the run-up in as-
set prices, we find that assets fall rapidly with age. 
Thus, both methods indicate that assets fall substantially 
with age. Although assets decline with age, the simplest 
versions of the life-cycle model predict even faster asset 
decumulation. Instead, we also show that our results 
fit better with versions of the life-cycle model that are 
augmented to include life expectancy and medical ex-
pense uncertainty, as well as bequest motives.
NOTES
1However, it might affect the savings decisions of the children; see 
Gale and Perozek (2001). Gale and Perozek also point out that the 
presence of a bequest motive does not imply that the estate tax re-
duces national savings. Whether the estate tax raises or lowers na-
tional savings depends upon the type of bequest motive, as well as 
the decisions of children.
2Specifically, we do more to take into account rates of return from 
investments other than housing and stocks, such as bonds. Also, we 
investigate more aspects of the return to housing, such as the value 
of the service flow provided by housing. We also match our esti-
mated returns in the flow of funds accounts to provide evidence on 
the quality of our estimated return procedures. Lastly, we exclude 
the value of trusts from our asset measure. This last point is de-
scribed further in the data section.
3An alternative of self-insuring against the risk of long life is to 
purchase annuities. However, very few people purchase annuities, 
potentially because administrative costs and adverse selection 
make them very expensive.
4Survivor probabilities are from the U.S. life tables (Arias, 2006).
5We assume that the interviews happened on January 1 of each 
year; for example, for the 1996 wave, we assume the interviews 
were held on January 1, 1996. Different people were interviewed  
at different times of the year. In all waves, at least 75 percent of all 
AHEAD households were interviewed within a few months of the 
assumed interview date (for example, between November 1995 
and March 1996 for the 1996 wave).
6We also drop AHEAD cases that overlap with the University of 
Michigan’s Health and Retirement Study. Of 5,990 households in 
the AHEAD, we drop 353 households because of this criterion.  
We also drop 678 households that left the sample for reasons other 
than death. This leaves us with 4,959 households. We also drop the 
first wave, because the first wave’s asset data are suspect. Because 
549 households have all members die by 1996, we are left with 
4,410 alive in 1996 for the main analysis, of whom 4,408 have use-
ful asset information. Of those 4,408 households, 2,304 households 
had at least one member still alive in 2004 and 2,104 households 
had all members die by 2004. 
7In order to be comparable to the rest of the literature, we do not 
include the value of the estate for those who die. See French,  
De Nardi, Jones, Baker, and Doctor (2006) for how including the  
value of the estate potentially affects estimates of asset rundown. 
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alternative approach shows a greater share of the average house-
hold’s portfolio in housing, liquid assets, and debt.
9Another 4 percent of wealth was in IRAs. Cheng and French 
(2000) find that 60 percent of all IRA wealth was held in stocks 
during our sample period, so it is likely that about 27 percent of 
household wealth was held in stocks directly or through IRAs. 
10To derive equation 2, note that equation 1 can be rewritten as 
A(it+1) = [(1+ r1(t)(1 – τ(it)))A1(t) + … + (1+ rK(t) (1 – τ(it)))AK(it)]  
    + S(it)  
  = A(it) + [(r1(t)(1 – τ(it)))A1(it) + … + (rK(t)(1 – τ(it)))AK(it)]   
    + S(it)  
  = (1 + [r1(t)s1(it) + … + rK(t)sK(it)] (1 – τ(it))) A(it) + S(it),
which is equation 1, with equation 2 substituted for r(it). 
11We assume that the return on debt and autos is 3 percent. We as-
sume that business wealth is split 15 percent and 85 percent be-
tween stocks and housing, respectively, which seemed to match 
growth in the flow of funds accounts better than any other combi-
nation of stocks and housing. Although it is difficult to know 
whether liquid assets, such as bonds, are short or long maturity in 
the flow of funds accounts, our best estimate was that 31 percent 
was in short-term financial instruments and the other 69 percent 
was in long-term instruments. 
12However, the series derived using portfolio shares gives a higher 
average return (average of 5.8 percent) than the flow of funds ac-
counts measure (average of 0.6 percent) over the sample period. 
The reason for the discrepancy is at least partly due to the flow of 
funds accounts’ measure of savings. The flow of funds accounts’ 
measure of income includes rent, dividends, and interest. Ideally, 
the savings measure would be free of rent, dividends, and interest, 
as they are part of the return from assets. Furthermore, the flow of 
funds accounts’ consumption measure does not include the service 
flow from owner-occupied housing. Thus, the flow of funds ac-
counts overstate our savings measure, and thus understate the re-
turn from assets. On the other hand, our return measures are not net 
of brokerage fees and administrative costs, so our method using 
shares may overstate the return households face.
13The reason for the lack of observations is that the core sample 
was age 70 and older in 1994, and thus age 76 and older by 2000.
14Because we have a fixed effect for each household, the age 74 co-
efficient is captured in the intercept term fi; the age 74 wealth level 
is just the average fixed effect for individuals aged 74.62 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
APPENDIX 1:  A MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE LIFE-CYCLE MODEL 
In order to fix ideas about the life-cycle model, we discuss 
a parameterized mathematical model of how individuals 
consume and save over their lives. In the figure 1 (p. 50), 
we show the implied consumption and wealth profiles 
for a given initial value of wealth and for income over 
the life cycle. Assume that there is no uncertainty about 
income, or medical expenses, although we will allow for 
uncertainty about age of death. The model is similar to 
that of Palumbo (1999), although it also allows for a 
bequest function, as in Hurd (1989).
Specifically, consider a household head seeking to 
maximize his expected lifetime utility at age t, t = 70, 
71, 72, ... . Each period that he lives, the individual receives 
utility, Ut, from consumption, Ct. Furthermore, assume 
that his preferences are of the constant relative risk  
aversion form, so that U
C
t






and Ut = lnCt if γ = 1. 
The parameter γ is called the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion. The greater the value of γ, the more risk averse 
the individual. Most estimates of γ are between 1 and 5. 
A value of γ equal to 1 implies that an individual would 
be indifferent to consuming $14,140 this year or con-
suming a sum determined by the following lottery: with 
probability 1/2 consume $10,000 this year and with prob-
ability 1/2 consume $20,000. Note that this lottery has 
an expected payout of 1/2 × $10,000 + 1/2 × $20,000 = 
$15,000. If the individual has γ equal to 5, an individual 
would be indifferent to consuming $11,700 this year or 
consuming a sum determined by the lottery described 
here. In other words, the greater the value of γ, the greater 
the amount the individual is willing to pay to avoid the 
risk associated with a lottery.
When the individual dies, he values bequests of 
assets, At, according to a constant relative risk aversion 
bequest function b A
C
t B







. The greater the 
value of θB, the stronger the bequest motive. We know 
very little about this parameter.
Let st denote the probability of being alive at  
age t, conditional on being alive at age t – 1, and let 








 = ∏ 1 denote the probability of living 
to age j  ≥ t, conditional on being alive at age t. Let T = 95 
denote the terminal period, so that sT+1 = 0.

























where Et is an expectations operator and β is the time dis-
count factor. The smaller the value of β, the more individu-
als discount the future relative to the present. Most esti-
mates of β are between 0.95 and 1.
Furthermore, assume that individuals have the follow-
ing asset accumulation equation:
A2)  At+1 = (1 + r) (At + Yt – mt – Ct), At+1 ≥ 0,
where r is the interest rate, Yt is income, and mt is the 
medical expenses. Assets must always be nonnegative in 
all periods.1 In this article, we present simulations from 
this model.
When presenting profiles implied by the model, 
we consider a value of γ equal to 3 and β equal to 0.95. 
Throughout the article, we will assume that assets in 
the bank receive a 4 percent rate of interest. Initial as-
sets at age 70 are $300,000 (which is close to the mean 
for our sample), and income at each age is $20,000 
(which is close to the mean in our sample).
1If the nonnegativity constraint on assets implies consumption be-
low $5,000 (which is a conservative estimate of the Supplemental 
Security Income, housing, and Medicaid benefits the elderly can 
receive), we set consumption equal to $5,000. See French and 
Jones (2004b) for more on this.63 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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would rent for if they were to rent them out. These two 
series are useful because they allow us to calculate growth 
in rents and housing, although they do not allow us to 
calculate the level of rents to house prices. Using these 
two series, we can calculate the relative inflation rates in 
the two series. We find the relative price of rents relative 
to housing (normalized to 1 in 2005) and multiply this 
by the 3.05 percent return in 2005. Using this series, we 
find that the return from the service flow from housing 
was 4.37 percent in 1982 and then fell to 3 percent in 2005. 
We assume the return from the service flow to housing was 
also 4.37 percent in all years before 1982. Figure A1 
shows our values for both house price inflation and also 
for house price inflation plus the service flow from hous-
ing, less the costs.
For price growth rates between 1950 and 
1971, data are from the price index for pri-
vate residential investment divided by the 
price index for all personal consumption 
expenditures, as measured in the NIPAs. 
For housing price growth after 1971, data 
are the price series from the Conventional 
Mortgage Home Price Index from the U.S. 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise  
Oversight, which measures the price change 
for resold single-family homes. Because the 
OFHEO index measures the price of the 
same houses over time, the index accounts 
for the fact that the quality of houses may 
have changed over time.
We calculate the service flow from 
housing, less the costs, using the following 
approach. We begin by measuring the ser-
vice flow from housing in 2005. Smith and 
Smith (2006) collected data in 2005 from  
ten metropolitan areas in the United States, 
and documented an average price of a house 
and the equivalent rental price for the same 
(or similar) property for each of those areas. 
They find that in 2005, the average annual 
rent on a house was 6 percent of its value. 
We made several assumptions about the 
annual costs associated with homeownership. In particu-
lar, we assumed that the total annual costs of owning a 
home were equal to 3 percent (1 percent for mainte-
nance, 1 percent for taxes, and 1 percent for transaction 
fees, assuming that total transaction fees were 6 percent 
and owners sold the house after 6 years of residency). 
Thus, we infer that the annual service flow of housing, 
net of costs, was 3.05 percent of the average house price 
in 2005.
Unfortunately, we are aware of no time series of 
rents, less the costs, for housing. However, we have time 
series on changes in rents (from the Consumer Price Index, 
or CPI, owners’ equivalent rent index, which began in 
1982) and changes in home prices (from the OFHEO). 
The CPI owners’ equivalent rent index is constructed from 
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Housing price appreciation
Total housing return (includes service flow less costs)
FIguRE a1
Growth in housing prices and total return from housing, 
1950–2005
annual percent change
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, national income and product accounts; U.S. Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight, Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index; U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, owners’ equivalent rent component; and 
Smith and Smith (2006).64 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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